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Community Property Considerations in Law Suits By and
Against Spouses
Lee Hargrave*
The rules governing the prosecution and defense of civil actions by married
persons living under a community property regime-actions that may ultimately
affect their community property-are primarily substantive law matters governed
by Louisiana Civil Code provisions. The imprecision in Louisiana's related
procedural statutes can result in some uncertainty, but once the basic rules are
applied, it appears that the procedural problems are subsumed by the substantive
law.
The overriding principle is that the community is not a legal entity with a
juridical personality.' The community owns nothing and owes nothing. It
cannot sue or be sued. No spouse "represents" the community as an agent or
mandatary? No judgment can be rendered for or against a community. Any
litigation involving third persons has to be with one (or both) of the spouses as
the party (or parties) in interest and not as agent (or agents) of a legal entity.
Also basic to this scheme is the general principle that the spouses, whether
under a community or separate regime, are to be treated as unmarried persons
of the age of majority in their ability to sue and be sued with respect to third
persons.' Spouses lose no status rights or juridical capacity upon marriage. At
least since the Married Women's Emancipation Acts, wives no longer lose some
management rights over their property in favor of their husbands." Since 1980,
they also have equal management rights over community assets and over the
management of their lawsuits.' The spouses are not automatic representatives
of each other absent consent or a special statute making them so.
Another important substantive rule is that spouses are governed by the general
laws of capacity and obligations in their contracts and torts. Especially important
is the concept of personal liability: "Whoever has bound himself personally, is
obliged to fulfill his engagements out of all his property, movable and immovable,
present and future."6 The important variation of this rule is the expansion
community property law makes in Louisiana Civil Code article 2345. If a
community exists, a spouse's obligations may be satisfied from the community
property as well as that spouse's separate property. This result follows even though
only one spouse incurs the obligation. It is so whether the obligation is community
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, LSU Law Center.
1. Under La. Civ. Code art. 2336, each spouse owns a present undivided half interest in each
item of community property. Title is not in a separate entity. Under Article 2325, debts of the
spouses can be satisfied by reaching community property, but the community has no debts.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2346 cmt. b.
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 27, 29, 98-100; La. R.S. 9:291 (1991).
4. La. R.S. 9:51-105 (1991) (Married Women Emancipation Acts).
5. 1979 La. Acts. No. 709.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 3182.
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or separate. It is so even if only one spouse is sued and found to be liable. 7 Under
this scheme, lawsuits may proceed against one spouse alone even though they affect
community property! Due process probably demands notice to the other spouse
before seizure of community assets. That notice, however, does not normally
extend to notice of the underlying lawsuit.9
It should not be necessary for a third person to sue both spouses or for both
spouses to join in a lawsuit against a third person unless the third person seeks a
personal judgment against both spouses, the substantive law so provides, or both
spouses want a personal judgment against the third person, again if the substantive
law provides for such a judgment.
The basic procedural rules to be invoked are Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure articles 681, 682 and 731, which provide that an action can be brought
only by a person having a real and actual interest in the claim and that a competent
major person has the procedural capacity to sue and be sued.'0
However, there are two special procedural statutes in effect that address the
"proper plaintiff" and "proper defendant" in litigation related to community
property. These statutes are discussed in the following sections. Basically, though,
the issue will become whether one spouse will be, conventionally or by law, the
representative of the other for litigation purposes. And, to the extent a state would
make one person the legal representative of another, Hansberry v. Lee" suggests
"that it would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bind
7. Rayne State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fruge, 546 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 551
So. 2d 1314 (1989).
8. In Arizona, the rule is that either spouse may contract debts, but, "[iln an action on such a
debt or obligation the spouses shall be sued jointly and the debt or obligation shall be satisfied: first,
from the community property, and second, from the separate property of the spouse contracting the
debt or obligation." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-215(D) (1991). In California, the community
property is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse regardless of which spouse has management
of the property and whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt.
Cal. Far. Code § 910 (West 1996).
9. 16 Katherine S. Spaht and W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 6.7, in 16 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1989); Michael H. Rubin & E. Keith Carter, Notice of Seizure in Mortgage
Foreclosures and Tax Sale Proceedings: The Ramifications of Mennonite, 48 La. L. Rev. 535
(1988).
10. Article 681 does state the real party in interest rule applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by law." However, the comment states that the exception "in the first clause of this article avoids
a conflict between it and Arts. 683, 684, 692 through 695. and 700." Apparently, Article 686, which
addresses the community right problem, is not considered an exception to the rule, but a reflection
of the same rule.
See generally Steven R. Plotkin, I Louisiana Civil Procedure 530-3 1: "The concept of the real
and/or actual party in interest insists that the named plaintiff possess the right sought to be enforced.
This concept does not specify which parties must be joined in the action, but instead guarantees that
those present are proper parties plaintiffs whose legal rights have allegedly been infringed and who
will be awarded redress if the action is successful. This rule satisfies the policy of due process notice
to the defendant and to the court concerning the type of action filed; it also promotes the doctrine
of res judicata."
11. 311 U.S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115 (1940).
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litigants to a judgment rendered in an earlier litigation to which they were not
* parties and in which they were not adequately represented."' 2
I. SUITS BY THE SPOUSES
When the husband was the sole manager of the community, it may well have
been appropriate to designate him as the manager of actions involving communi-
ty property. At that time, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 686 referred
to him as the "proper plaintiff' to sue to enforce "a right of the community."
To solve the procedural problems that could arise when it was uncertain whether
a right was community or separate, the 1960 procedural reform also provided
that when such doubt existed "the husband and wife may sue in the alternative
to enforce the right."
13
Upon adoption of equal management in 1979, Article 686 was amended to
provide simply that "either spouse is the proper plaintiff' to "sue to enforce a
community right.""' However, "if one spouse is the managing spouse with
respect to the community right sought to be enforced," then that spouse alone
may bring the action. In case of doubt now as to whether the right is separate
or community, the article also provides "that spouse" may sue in the alternative
to enforce the right. "[T]hat spouse" presumably refers to the one whose
separate right it might also be.
In 1979, a third paragraph was also added to Article 686 to make it clear
that the non-suing spouse would never be an indispensable party. It stated that
the spouse was only a necessary party, and added the unique provision that the
judge on his own motion could order the other spouse to be joined to prevent an
injustice to that spouse. Article 686 was not amended in 1995 when Articles 641
and 642 were amended to abolish the distinction between indispensable and
necessary parties and to adopt instead a flexible statement of considerations to
guide judges in deciding whether litigation could proceed without what had been
considered indispensable parties." In any event, the basic rule remains the
same; litigation by one spouse alone is not precluded, and judicial discretion
governs whether the litigation can proceed without the other. Also, under new
Article 645, the failure to join a party "may be noticed by the trial or appellate
court on its own motion" in any case.
A basic problem with Article 686 is its reference to a "community right."
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing. The community is not a juridical
12. Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996).
13. La. Code Civ. P. art. 686 (1960).
14. 1979 La. Acts No. 711.
15. 1995 La. Acts No. 662. The drafter's comment states: "The amendments ... codify the
holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State Department of Highways v. Lamar Advertising Co.
of La. ... that courts determine whether a party should be joined and whether the action could
proceed if the party could not be joined by a factual nalysis of the interests involved." See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19.
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person that can be the subject of rights. As between husband and wife, it may
be convenient to speak of community or non-community obligations and rights,
and it may be an acceptable standard to solve accounting problems between the
spouses.' 6 Third persons, however, do not contract with a community and are
not harmed by delicts or torts committed by a community. Third persons
contract with individuals: a husband, a wife, or both of them. If litigation arises
over such contracts, the privity principle would govern and the real party in
interest, the contracting party or parties, would bring the lawsuit. The other
spouse may be affected financially by any judgment, and thus may have an
interest in the litigation, but the third person is entitled to be sued by and to
litigate with whom he contracted.
It is true that even though one spouse does not represent the community, one
spouse can represent the other spouse. Basic agency law comes into play, and
a spouse may appoint the other as agent or representative to conduct litigation.
It may be that the other spouse may ratify the actions of the first and also be
bound.' 7 At one point, the community property law in some states made the
husband the representative of the wife. But that view has been rejected.'
16. La. Civ. Code arts. 2359-2369.
17. See Cotton v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 676 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 459 (1982) ("it would blink reality for us to say that the trial court erred in
finding that Cotton so identified himself in the litigation dealing with the foreclosure of the security
deeds as to make it his own litigation. The trial court could hardly ignore the affirmative statement,
twice used in the complaint, that Mr. and Mrs. Cotton entered into the security deed arrangement
with the Bank. Moreover, by filing the suit in the United States Court, seeking to enjoin the state
foreclosure proceeding, the husband fully injected himself into the defense of the state court suit."
Id. at 1370.).
18. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Judgment Involving Real Property Against One Spouse as
Binding Against Other Spouse Not a Party to the Proceeding, 58 A. L. R. 2d 701 (1958). As a
general proposition, "it is recognized that husband and wife are not privies merely because of the
marital relationship." Id. at 708. But one spouse may be the agent of the other, and "virtual
representation" of the wife by the husband was adopted in California and Texas. However, the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1980) recognized the rule was in disfavor.
In § 41, it is provided that a judgment is res judicata as to a party "represented by a party"
including one "i]nvested by the person with authority to represent him in an action." In Comment
(b) to § 41, it was stated, "[a) similar fiduciary and representative relationship has been recognized
in the husband with respect to interests in community property... although community property law
is now changing to provide that each spouses has managerial authority over community property...
leaving the problem of representation in litigation in considerable confusion .. "
The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that since that state's law removed the husband's sole right
to manage the community, the basis for virtual representation had disappeared. Each spouse had the
same rights and there was no basis for the virtual representation theory. Cooper v. Texas Gulf
Industries, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974) (a judgment to which one spouse is a party no longer
binds the other under the doctrine of virtual representation). See Kyle W. Rost, Note, Family Code
Section 5.22 Abolishes Virtual Representation Between Spouses: Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure Substantially Eliminates the Class of Jurisdictionally Indispensable Persons, Cooper v.
Texas Gulf Industries, Inc., 52 Tex. L. Rev. 1410, 1413 (1974).
Normally, a judgment for or against a coowner of property does not affect the other coowners.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 54 (1980).
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One might ask whether Article 686 as amended in 1979 made either spouse,
by operation of law, the automatic procedural representative or virtual representa-
tive of the other. That probably was not the case. The original provision
reflected substantive matrimonial regimes rules that made the husband the sole
manager of the community property; he did not represent his wife personally at
that time, as evidenced by the fact that judgments against him left the wife's
separate property untouched by his litigation. The 1979 amendments were
adopted to reflect equality policies and nothing suggests a policy of making each
spouse the personal representative of the other for litigation. To the contrary,
great care was taken in other articles to allow both spouses to insulate their
separate property from the claims of creditors of the other spouse.' 9 Indeed, if
Article 686 were to make both spouses the procedural representatives of the
other, Article 695 would be unnecessary. The latter provides that if the
managing spouse of some community right sought to be enforced is an absentee
or a mental incompetent, the other spouse is the proper plaintiff to assert the
right.
In any event, it ought to be clear that a defendant sued by one spouse in
community when the defendant contracted with or caused harm to the other
spouse should have a right to litigate against the spouse with whom he dealt. He
should succeed with an exception of no right of action by the other spouse."0
If it is true that either spouse is a proper party, it also follows that both
spouses are proper parties to enforce the "community right." The procedural
revision is unclear as to what happens if the spouses disagree about how to
conduct the litigation. Of overriding concern, of course, is protection of the third
person who is being sued. He ought to be as free as possible from the problems
of spousal disputes. For example, if the spouses cannot agree over whom to hire
as a lawyer, presumably each could be represented by his or her own counsel
without seriously interfering with the rights of the defendant. On the other hand,
if the spouses proceed under inconsistent theories or pose allegations that are
unfair to the defendant, the Code provides little relief. The basic factor here is
that the statute clearly conceives of both spouses being plaintiffs to prevent
injustice and it would seem impossible to prevent such injustice if that spouse
is not given the power to do something to protect his or her interests. The
implication seems to be that there is a right to present something, and presum-
ably the court's inherent power would have to be the source of authority for the
judge to accommodate their rights and the rights of the defendant to accomplish
justice.
An additional problem results from the exception that if one spouse is the
"managing spouse with respect to the community right" involved, that spouse is
the proper plaintiff in an action to enforce that right. It should be clear under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2348 and 2350 that when one spouse renounces the
19. La. Civ. Code arts. 2345, 2357.
20. La. Code Civ. P. art. 927(5).
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right to participate in management of a community enterprise, the other spouse
is the "sole manager" and thus becomes the "managing spouse." It is arguable,
although less clear, that if a registered movable is in the name of one spouse
alone, since only that spouse can alienate, encumber or lease it, that spouse is the
"managing spouse" of that property and may be the sole proper party to enforce
a right related to that vehicle. This was suggested in Banks v. Rattler,2' where
the court reasoned that a wife could not assert a claim for damages to a
community vehicle that was titled in her husband's name alone. However, the
case is not strong on the point, for the court allowed the husband to intervene
and assert the claim.
It is also not clear what other types of situations would result in a spouse
being the "managing spouse" of certain property and what the reference to
"managing spouse of a community right" is. Because these terms are imprecise
and undefined, they leave room for flexibility in court construction in light of
basic policies involved. Those basic policies here, for example, would center on
relieving third party defendants from injustice and uncertainty caused by spousal
disagreement when the spouses are asserting claims against them. Of less
concern here is the possibility of unfairness to the spouses caused by the fraud
or bad faith of the other.
The Banks case is an example of the need for flexibility. There, a guest
passenger sued the driver of the other car involved in an automobile accident,
who in turn filed a third party demand against the wife/driver of the car. The
husband and wife reconvened for the amount of damages caused to the car titled
in the husband's name. The court then faced the anomalous situation in which
the wife was not the proper party to sue for damages to the car and the husband
was not entitled to reconvene because he had not been sued. The solution to
allow liberal intervention was procedurally efficient and just, but it also
suggested that one should construe the concept of exclusive management
narrowly when third parties are not put at a disadvantage. Here, since it was the
wife who was engaged in the conduct that may have caused the injury, it was
preferable to have her in the litigation rather than the husband.
In 1960, Prof. Henry George McMahon's official comments to the
procedural reforms then adopted stated:
The substantive rules of community property are legal rules of
accounting between the community and separate estates which usually
are of no concern to the defendant. The only justification for procedur-
al rules on the subject are: (1) a recognition of the husband as head
and master of the community to prevent any unauthorized assertion by
the wife of a community right; (2) protection of the rights of the forced
heirs and creditors of the husband; and (3) protection of a defendant
against double recovery. Time and time again the courts have permitted
a defendant, completely protected against double recovery, to defeat a
21. 426 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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wife's suit when the evidence technically showed that the right sought
to be enforced by the wife, with the husband's approval, was a
community right; or when the evidence failed to rebut the presumption
that it was a community right.
In light of the 1980 matrimonial regime reforms, the first justification no longer
exists. In light of forced heirship reforms, the second is not nearly as important
as it might have been. The main consideration should be protection of the
defendant in the litigation. That protection is not served by allowing a spouse
not in privity to proceed with the litigation against the third person.
II. SUITS AGAINST THE SPOUSES
Under the prior law, when only the husband could manage community assets
or incur community debts, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 735 simply
provided that "[t]he husband is the proper defendant in an action to enforce an
obligation against the marital community."' It also provided that in case of
doubt whether it was a community obligation or one of the wife, the spouses
could be sued in the alternative. 3 When the equal management reform was
adopted in 1979, the article was changed to make "either spouse" the proper
defendant "in an action to enforce an obligation against community property."
Exception was made if one spouse is the "managing spouse with respect to the
obligation sought to be enforced against the community property." And, when
doubt exists as to the nature of the obligation, the spouses may be sued in the
alternative.' Also added was the provision that when only one spouse is sued,
the other is not an indispensable party, but only a necessary party, with the
proviso that to prevent "an injustice to that spouse" the court may order joinder
of the spouse on its own motion.
As was the case with parties plaintiff, Article 735 was not changed in 1995
when Articles 641 and 642 were amended to abolish the distinction between
indispensable and necessary parties and to adopt instead a flexible statement of
considerations to guide judges in deciding whether litigation could proceed
without what had been considered indispensable parties. 5 In any event, the
basic rule remains the same. Litigation against one spouse alone is permitted,
and judicial discretion governs whether the litigation can proceed without the
other spouse. Under new Article 645, the failure to join a party "may be noticed
by the trial or appellate court on its own motion" in any case.
Under former Article 735, some doubt might have existed as to what is an
action to "enforce an obligation against the marital community." That
22. La. Code Civ. P. art. 735 (1960).
23. Id.
24. La. Code Civ. P. art. 735.
25. 1995 La. Acts No. 662.
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terminology was imprecise, for the community is not a separate entity with its
own juridical personality; it had to refer to a community debt or obligation. That
imprecision caused no serious problem, though, for the husband was the sole
manager of the community and any actions clearly were to be against him.
Amended Article 735 is even more imprecise, for it now refers to an action
to "enforce an obligation against community property." In a strict construction,
this text could be limited to some kind of in rem action against the property. It
would not include a personal action which, if carried to judgment, could result
in seizure and sale of community property. The imprecision is magnified
because of the reference in the second paragraph of the article to the obligation
being "a community obligation or the separate obligation," suggesting that the
initial action is also covered and not just enforcement of judgments.
In any event, here again, recourse to basic substantive law principles and
constitutional due process will overshadow Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 735 and will provide the overriding rules. The basic notion, as stated
earlier, is that the community is not a separate entity that can engage in
contractual relations or come under obligations for damages caused by torts.
Only the husband or the wife can enter into such relationships with respect to
personal obligations. This is in contrast to real rights with respect to things,
where perhaps suits related to such things could be brought against any
co-owner.26 But if a plaintiff wants to assert a fight against a person who is
married under the community regime, it must be asserted against that person.
Whether it be a matter of contract, quasi-contract or tort, the spouse in privity
must be sued. If one spouse engaged in the contract or committed the tort,
making him personally liable on a judgment that was secured against the other
spouse would probably be an unconstitutional denial of due process.27
Again, the main issue will become whether a spouse has consented to
appointment of the other as a representative or agent for the litigation, or has
ratified the actions of the other spouse representing the first, or whether a statute
purports to appoint a representative for the other spouse. As was discussed in
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2321. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that a co-owner of a bull could
be held responsible for harm caused by the animal; "regardless of whether owners also had custody."
Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Cooperative, Inc., 496 So. 2d 275, 276 (La. 1986); 434 So. 2d
404 (La. 1983). Under the liability for acts of children under La. Civ. Code art. 2318, either parent
would be liable.
But see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 54 (1980). Normally a judgment for or against a
coowner of property does not affect the other co-owners.
. 27. In Traweek v. Larking, 708 S.W.2d 942 (Tx. App. 1986), the tort victim had sued and
obtained a judgment against the husband during the community. After the spouses divorced, the
victim sued the wife, contending she was liable for the former judgment. The court held she was not.
While the judgment could reach the wife's interest in community property, the wife who was not a
party to the initial suit was not personally bound.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950),
the court said, "[t]his right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
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the previous section, it is unlikely that Article 735 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure was meant to make such an appointment.
The original provision was consistent with the substantive rule that made the
husband the sole manager of the community property; he did not represent the
wife personally in transactions and in litigation, as evidenced by the rule that
judgments against him left the wife's separate property untouched. The 1979
amendments were adopted to impose equality and nothing suggests a policy of
favoring creditors by making each spouse the personal representative of the
other. To the contrary, great care was taken in other articles to allow both
spouses to insulate their separate property from the claims of creditors of the
other spouse."8
That Article 735 is unnecessary is illustrated by the procedure available to
enforce a criminal fine. If a husband is guilty of the crime, he may be
convicted, and there is no way to make the wife part of the trial even though the
fine will be enforced by proceeding against community property. If the husband
fails to pay the fine, Article 886 of the Code of Criminal Procedure intervenes
and allows the state to collect the fine in the same manner as a money judgment
in a civil case. This means the state may access his separate property and
community assets. 9
The case of Fowler v. Dunshee30 points to the difficulties in this area. An
action to collect on a note executed by the husband during marriage was filed
against both ex-spouses after their divorce. The former husband could not be
found and was not served. The ex-wife defended the suit, arguing primarily that
the debt was the husband's separate obligation. The lower court proceeded to
judgment and held her personally liable on the note. The court of appeal
reversed the personal judgment against her and limited the plaintiff's relief to
that provided in Louisiana Civil Code article 2357-recourse against the property
of the former community. Relieving the wife from personal liability on the
husband's note is of course required by the substantive law, even though the
court may have had personal jurisdiction over the wife in the litigation. Also,
the court's disposition may have been appropriate in light of the arguments of
the wife, which concentrated on classification of the husband's debt rather than
the scope of the relief under Louisiana Civil Code article 2357."'
Judge Kliebert argued in dissent, however, that recourse against the former
community property was not proper. Even if Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 735 could constitutionally allow the non-contracting spouse to represent
the contracting one, it was inapplicable here since the couple was divorced when
the action was filed. As he pointed out, "once the community has been
28. La. Civ. Code arts. 2345, 2357.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 2345.
30. 511 So. 2d 1323 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
31. It is not clear from the record, but it may be that the court's action settled the matter to the
ex-wife's satisfaction in light of her testimony suggesting the nonexistence of any former community
assets. Transcript pp. 22-34.
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terminated and its assets partitioned, the spouse who incurs the obligation is an
indispensable party to proceedings to reduce the obligation to judgment."32
Perhaps the majority's position can be sustained as a type of in rem proceeding
against property, but if so, the plaintiff has no personal judgment against the
contracting debtor. Perhaps the other spouse who obtained the property in a
partition is not denied due process if given the opportunity to defend, as in this
case.
An action against a nonresident or an absentee husband (once jurisdiction is
obtained) could have proceeded in this case by appointment of a curator ad hoc
to represent the interests of the absent person. 3 Such a proceeding produces
a valid personal judgment against the nonresident. But this would normally have
to be supported by proof of the .attempt to serve the absentee and a court
determination that another person is appropriate to represent the absent person.
In many cases, a spouse can appropriately represent those interests, especially if
that spouse has community property that might be affected by the judgment.
But, the possibility of fraud between quarreling spouses and cooperative third
persons is also a reality, justifying the necessity for court findings of the
appropriateness of the representation.
The substantive law, rather than the procedural rules, also explains the result
in a case like Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Nata.34 Both spouses bought a car and
both signed the promissory note and chattel mortgage as solidary obligors. The
lender could then properly proceed against only the husband under executory
process to seize and sell the car. The husband was personally liable, and under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2345, the car was subject to seizure by virtue of the
fact that all community property is subject to seizure for the debt of either
spouse. It was not necessary to sue the wife to be able to reach the vehicle.
Under those circumstances, there was no wrongful seizure even if the wife was
never sued.
The most serious problem in this area is the one that Article 735 does not
address-whether the non-party spouse must be served with notice of the (a)
action on the obligation or (b) steps to enforce a judgment when community
property may be at risk to satisfy the obligation. It is likely that some such
notice is required, and the cautious plaintiff and judge will provide such notice
to both spouses in all cases where enforcement against community property may
be contemplated."
Another problem that can arise, when both spouses are sued, is conflicting
theories espoused by them. As discussed in the previous section, little authority
exists other than the inherent powers of a court to control its proceeding so as
to protect the opposite parties to the litigation. One specific matter that is
32. 511 So. 2d at 1326.
33. La. Code of Civ. P. arts. 5091-5097; La. . S. 13:3201.3204 (1991 and Supp. 1996).
34. 469 So. 2d II (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 474 So. 2d 1309 (1985).
35. Spaht and Hargrave, supra note 9, § 6.7.
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addressed by the Louisiana Civil Code, however, is the defense of prescription.
Under Article 3453, "[c]reditors and other persons having an interest," that latter
category presumably including a spouse, "in the extinction of a claim or of a real
right by prescription may plead prescription, even if the person in whose favor
prescription has accrued renounces or fails to plead prescription."

